Which Legislative Act Established The Usaf As A Separate, Independent Military Service?

The creation of a split up American air arm settled a four-decade debate.

It was a hot mean solar day at Washington's National Airport on July 26, 1947, equally President Harry S. Truman'south limousine drove up to Sacred Cow, a Douglas C-54 Skymaster. Truman was on his way to visit his mother, who was gravely ill with pneumonia. But before the president left he intended to sign an of import slice of legislation—the National Security Act of 1947, an executive society passed by Congress the previous mean solar day defining the roles and missions of the armed services—as well as his nomination for the first secretarial assistant of defense force. In the terminate, Truman had to expect nearly an hr in the sweltering rut for the historic documents to arrive.

Information technology took only a few minutes for the president to sign the paperwork, but information technology had taken decades to bring about these cardinal changes in the United states of america military system. The Security Act's main purpose was to merge the Department of War and the Department of the Navy into the National Armed services Establishment, to be headed past a secretary of defense force. Further, information technology authorized the institution of the Air Forcefulness as an independent service, marking the culmination of a national dispute that had begun four decades earlier.

Soon after the Wright brothers proved their theories of powered flight, writer H.G. Wells in his 1908 book The State of war in the Air foresaw that the air power of nations would revolutionize the conduct and social consequences of war. In 1909 Italian ground forces Major Giulio Douhet saw the potential of fixed-wing shipping and predicted that the sky "is about to become another battlefield no less important than the battlefields on state and sea." He too foresaw the consequences of allowing air power to be restrained by ground commanders and advocated the creation of a divide air arm led by airmen.

The rapid improvements in winged aircraft prompted several American lawmakers also to think alee and propose that air forces should exist organized and then they could human activity independently. In Feb 1913, Rep. James Hay of Virginia proposed a bill that would have created a separate aviation corps every bit one of the line components of the Regular army. Congressman Charles Lieb of Indiana introduced a bill in March 1916 to create an independent air force. Neither neb went beyond committee hearings.

Battles of opposing forces in the air became a fact during Earth State of war I in Europe, and Winston Churchill, then government minister of munitions for the British war attempt, regretted in October 1917 that there had been no written report of the possibilities of organizing air operations "not merely equally an ancillary service to the special operations of the Army or Navy, but also as an independent arm cooperating in the full general program." Great britain, in fact, established the world's outset contained air arm on April 1, 1918, when it merged the army's Royal Flight Corps and the Royal Naval Air Service into the Majestic Air Force.

In May 1919, U.South. Assistant Secretary of State of war Bridegroom C. Crowell headed a commission to study the military aviation arms of Centrolineal countries during the recently ended conflict. The commission's report recommended a unified air arrangement co-equal to the Navy and War departments, to include military and civilian aviation. A flurry of bills was subsequently initiated, and the first hearings were held in 1919 by Rep. Fiorello LaGuardia's subcommittee on aviation of the House Committee on Military Affairs. LaGuardia, who had served as commander of an air unit of measurement on the Italian front, was aviation'south leading vocalism in Congress. He backed efforts to detach the Army Air Service from the grip of the Regular army'south ground-bound full general staff and supported a bill introduced by Rep. Charles F. Curry calling for a regular Air Force, Reserve and National Guard. At the aforementioned fourth dimension, Sen. Harry S. New introduced a bill for a U.Due south. Air Forcefulness in a Department of Aeronautics that would control the military only as well aviation in other government departments likewise as commercial air operations. But none of those legislative efforts received whatsoever worthy support.

In 1923 Maj. Gen. Mason Patrick, primary of the Air Service, appointed a grouping of officers led past Brig. Gen. William Lassiter "to consider in all details a plan of war organization for the Air Service" and told the secretary of war that "our Air Service [must] accept a strength and an arrangement permitting rapid expansion to see the requirements of a state of war and then be capable of steady expansion to come across the ultimate requirements of the war." Lassiter'south report cautioned that "unless steps are taken to amend weather in the Air Service it volition, in effect, be practically demobilized at an early on date." A 10- year programme was recommended, to include a force of bombardment and pursuit units to carry out independent missions under the command of the Army full general staff. Such an expansion would cost an estimated $495 million.

The Lassiter report was forwarded to Secretary of War John W. Weeks, just its recommendations never got airborne. President Warren G. Harding'southward death in August 1923 brought Vice President Calvin Coolidge into the White House. Coolidge was committed to a rigid economical programme that did not include funding for aviation advances. His lack of interest in military flying prompted an undocumented story that he had asked Secretary Weeks: "What'south all this talk near lots of airplanes? Why not buy one airplane and let the Army pilots take turns flying information technology?"

A Firm committee chaired past Rep. Florian Lampert in March 1924 went beyond the Lassiter board'south recommendations every bit the American military machine's air capabilities deteriorated. The commission wanted to know why the Lassiter plan had not been adopted. Subsequently nearly a twelvemonth of exhaustive hearings, the group proposed a unified air force independent of the Regular army and Navy under the coordination of a Department of Defense on an evolutionary timetable.

Into the political conflict after Earth War I stepped the fiery, outspoken Brig. Gen. William "Billy" Mitchell. Already known for his vitriolic criticisms of superiors and others in high places, he began a speaking and writing entrada calculated to alert the public to the sorry state of war machine aviation. He appeared before the Lambert Commission and besides at hearings called by Rep. John F. Curry, whose bills for a unified aviation service were pending in Congress for many months. Unfortunately for the air forcefulness's immediate future, Mitchell's credibility was bedridden due to allegations that he did not back upward his claims with sufficient proof. He was informed by Secretary Weeks that his deportment rendered him "unfit for a loftier administrative postal service." Mitchell was court-martialed in November 1925 for insubordination and disobedience of civilian dominance and sentenced to five years' suspension at half pay. He elected to resign in February 1926.

Many Army Air Service pilots agreed with Mitchell about the sad land of military aviation, but they found themselves unable to disregard his methods or publicly support his charge almost "the incompetency, criminal negligence, and almost treasonable administration of the National Defense force by the Navy and Army."

At the height of the Mitchell tumult, in September and October 1925 President Coolidge called for a board of war machine men and civilians, chaired past Dwight W. Morrow, to report "the all-time means of developing and applying aircraft in national defense." This board's conclusion was a thwarting to those who wanted a split up air strength. It found that the United States was in no danger of air set on and saw no reason for a carve up Department for Air to coordinate with the Army and Navy departments, nor did it recommend the creation of a Section of National Defence. Nevertheless, the lath did recommend that the Air Service be renamed the Air Corps, with aviation representation on the Army general staff. Those provisions were included in the Air Corps Act on July 2, 1926, "thereby strengthening the conception of military machine aviation as an offensive, hit arm rather than an auxiliary service."

The legislation also authorized a five-year program for the Army and Navy and evolution of a continuing enquiry and procurement program with a goal of 1,800 planes, 1,650 officers and 15,000 enlisted men. Simply those goals were non realized because sufficient funds were never appropriated. The post-obit years saw the outset of the Nifty Low.

No pregnant progress was made to meliorate the United States' military aviation program until January 1933, when the General Headquarters Air Force (Provisional) was established to test the feasibility of a central striking force under the pinnacle command of the Army.

Such a force was intended to defend the coasts and overseas possessions, leaving the Navy's fleet assured of freedom of activeness with no responsibleness for littoral defense. It followed so that the Air Corps could not defend American coasts and overseas possessions without bombardment and observation aircraft. This agreement gave the Air Corps the correct to engage in seaward reconnaissance, which required the development of long-range bombers. But the Army full general staff did not agree that the Air Corps should operate without Regular army support or exist concentrated under a unmarried air command. In Oct 1933, the War Department established a board, headed by Deputy Chief of Staff Maj. Gen. Hugh A. Drum, to report Air Corps policies. His board opposed whatever departure from previous War Department guidelines.

Meanwhile, Billy Mitchell continued to affirm that American air ability was inadequate, obsolescent and ranked last among world powers. During iii months in early 1934, Air Corps pilots flew and died while taking over the task of carrying the U.Due south. Mail. As a peacetime examination, however, the airmail operation proved valuable since information technology forcefully pointed out the serious inadequacies in Air Corps equipment and training.

The battle for a split up air force was yet raging when Newton D. Baker, former World War I secretary of war, was tagged in 1934 by President Franklin D. Roosevelt with heading a new committee of inquiry, the 15th such grouping convened to study military aviation and the question of an contained air arm. The commission's final report reflected the thinking of those whose minds were withal closed to the airplane'south potential. The loudest voice on the committee against the cosmos of an contained air force was Full general Pulsate, who believed the Air Corps should procure aircraft suitable for close air support of advancing troops. Nevertheless, the concept of the GHQ Air Forcefulness had been approved, representing the first existent stride toward an independent air arm. It was created to provide a strategic striking force wherein all combat air units were under the command of the various Ground forces corps commanders and organized administratively into iv geographic air forces within the United States. Information technology further provided for 980 aircraft, of which only 174 were shortrange, tactical first line combat aircraft inadequate for long-range, strategic missions. Although these air forces were responsible for training, aircraft development, doctrine and supply, the Army ground force commanders still controlled the air bases, including the support personnel.

Just one man on the Baker committee submitted a minority statement. Racing airplane pilot James H. "Jimmy" Doolittle, then an Air Corps Reservist, declined to sign the bulk report because of the lath's refusal to support an independent air arm. "I believe that the future security of our nation is dependent upon an adequate air forcefulness," he wrote. "This is true at the present time and will become increasingly of import as the science of aviation advances and the aeroplane lends itself more and more to the art of warfare. I am convinced that the required air forcefulness tin can be more quickly organized, equipped and trained if it is completely separated from the Army and developed as a separate arm. If consummate separation is non the desire of the commission, I recommend an air strength as a part of the Army only with a separate budget, a divide promotion list, and removed from the control of the General Staff."

Later asked by a reporter what he thought most the study, Doolittle replied: "The country will some 24-hour interval pay for the stupidities of those who were in the majority on this commission. They know every bit much about the future of aviation as they practice about the sign writing of the Aztecs."

Brigadier Full general Frank M. Andrews was appointed the first GHQ commander in March 1935. He chose staff members who believed in developing bomber capabilities, and they prepared a doctrine that stressed precision bombing of enemy industrial targets past heavily armed long-range aircraft. Meanwhile, a small grouping of engineering officers at Wright Field, Ohio, had already been analyzing plans for low-wing, all-metal, multi-engine bombers. In May 1934, the Ground forces chief of staff had authorized the negotiation of contracts for preliminary designs. The objective was to develop a x-yr plan to produce four dissimilar bombers, each to exist progressively larger, faster and able to carry bigger bombloads over great distances. The Boeing B-9, Martin B-10 and B-12 were developed along those lines, followed by the Boeing B-17.

But there were still organizational problems. General Andrews wrote an audacious letter to the House Military Diplomacy Commission endorsing an Air Corps Reorganization Bill that would provide for the Air Corps to operate on an equal status with the ground Ground forces and take its own promotion list and budget. The Army's general staff members were appalled at that recommendation; in 1939 Andrews was reduced in rank from major general to colonel and transferred to San Antonio. His chief staff officers, all of whom later on became generals, were likewise transferred to other locations. As one writer commented, "thanks to this biting-end opposition, nosotros came upward to the brink of state of war with nineteen underdeveloped Flying Fortresses, a few trained crews, a starved organization for Air Ability, and no law defining where Navy responsibility began and Army responsibility left off."

The basic problem was still at that place: no unity of command and the GHQ Air Forcefulness was separated from the Air Corps, its logistic organization. But this dilemma was partially solved on June 21, 1941, when the War Department created the Army Air Forces and the GHQ Air Force became the Air Forces Combat Command. An Air Staff was authorized to plan and carry out the expansion of the entire air arm, with Lt. Gen. Henry H. Arnold named chief of the Army Air Forces. He was thus a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, serving nether Army General George C. Marshall as the Allies fought and won World War Two.

Postwar planning had already begun when the nation's armed services forces rapidly disbanded after the Japanese surrender in 1945. Full general Arnold and his Pentagon staff lobbied for congressional legislation establishing a Section of National Defence with a divide Air Force on an equal basis with the Army and Navy. General Dwight D. Eisenhower was for information technology, since he had seen that the Army and Air Forces could work together provided in that location was a single decision-maker in charge. The Navy balked. Retired General Jimmy Doolittle explained his own view in his memoirs: "If a Section of National Defense were not approved, we thought nosotros might even so get a separate and equal Air Force. The reward would be that the Air Strength would be on a par with the other ii services, both operationally and politically. Nonetheless, the disadvantage would be that in that location would be 3 instead of 2 bickerers if there were non a single head of the whole institution to knock heads together. Teamwork had won the war, non one single service."

While the United States went through the throes of returning to economic normality, Congress vigorously debated the issue. The Navy'due south worst fears centered on the powers of a secretary of defence and concerns that the Navy and Marine Corps aviation units would be given to the Air Force. Several unification bills were presented, and a compromise was finally reached that resulted in the National Defense Human action of 1947, which created the National Armed forces Establishment, including the office of the secretary of defense and the Departments of the Army, Navy and Air Force. The missions of the Navy and Marine air arms and the Air Forcefulness were spelled out by Executive Order No. 9877. President Truman nominated James V. Forrestal, then secretarial assistant of the Navy, to be the outset secretary of defense. Those were the documents that Truman waited to sign planeside on July 26, 1947, at National Airdrome.

The official birthday of the U.S. Air Force is recognized as September 18, 1947, the date when W. Stuart Symington, onetime senator from Missouri, was sworn in as the first secretary of the Air Force. Although Billy Mitchell did not live to see that day, his dreams about an independent air arm equal to the Army and Navy had finally been realized.

Originally published in the September 2007 issue of Aviation History. To subscribe, click here.

Source: https://www.historynet.com/long-road-independent-air-force.htm

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